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KEYNOTE ADDRESS




Most regulatory reform after the global financial crisis represents polit-
ically motivated reactions to that crisis. The Dodd-Frank Act, for example,
puts much weight on reforming mortgage financing. It’s unlikely, though,
that the next financial crisis will result from subprime mortgage lending.
Indeed, because the financial system is constantly changing, future financial
crises are unlikely to resemble, and may have very different causes than,
past crises.
We’re currently shifting, for example, to shadow banking, which has
been estimated as $67 trillion worldwide.1 In shadow banking, dis-
intermediated modes of financing—including money-market mutual funds,
securitization, hedge funds, and repo financing—are replacing traditional
bank lending. We need to develop a financial regulatory framework that can
anticipate, or at least respond to, future financial crises and a dynamically
changing financial system. Traditionally, financial regulation has been
tethered to the financial architecture at the time the regulation is promul-
gated. The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, focuses heavily on the complex
mortgage-backed securities and derivatives that are believed to have been
triggers of the financial crisis. The Glass-Steagall Act limited the ability of
commercial banks to engage in securities underwriting, which was thought
to have “fueled the rampant stock speculation preceding the 1929 Crash and
* Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School of Law; Founding
Director, Duke Global Financial Markets Center. E-mail: schwarcz@law.duke.edu. This Keynote
Address is copyright © 2014 and is based in part on portions of the author’s forthcoming article,
“Regulating Financial Change: A Functional Approach.” Support has been provided in part by a
gift to Duke Law School from the Eugene T. Bost, Jr. Research Professorship of The Cannon
Charitable Trust No. 3.
1. See FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 3 (2012),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121118c.pdf (estimating shadow banking’s
worldwide assets as $67 trillion in 2011).
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contributed to subsequent bank failures.”2 The Federal Reserve’s Regula-
tions G, U, T, and X limited margin lending (lending to enable borrowers to
purchase publicly traded stock, with the loans secured by the purchased
stock), in response to concerns that such lending similarly encouraged stock
speculation.3 And the Commodity Exchange Act responded to complaints
“that futures traders were manipulating and ‘fixing’ market prices.”4
That type of grounded regulation has value as long as it is constantly
updated to adapt to changes in the financial architecture.5 But without con-
tinuous monitoring and updating, financial innovations will escape regula-
tion, and outmoded regulation might inadvertently have unanticipated
consequences.
In certain contexts, continuous monitoring and work may be feasible.
Witness the ongoing monitoring and updating of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC), undertaken by the American Law Institute and the Uniform
Law Commission.6 Being primarily the province of federal law, however,
financial regulation is subject to the dysfunctions of Congress—and so, at
least in the near future, we cannot depend on reliable, continuous monitor-
ing or updating.
In thinking about regulating our dynamically changing financial sys-
tem, it may be more useful to focus on the system’s functions rather than on
the changing structure of the system that performs those functions. When I
was trained as an aerospace engineer, we called this a “black-box” ap-
proach, which involves examining the functionality of a process or applica-
tion without worrying about the details of its internal structure. This
approach facilitates the analysis of a highly complex or unknown structure.7
To that end, let’s first consider how “microprudential” regulation could be
designed to make the financial system function more efficiently. Thereafter,
let’s consider the problem of systemic risk—the risk that the failure of fi-
nancial markets or firms undermines the very ability of the financial system
(or parts thereof) to function, thereby harming the real economy by increas-
2. Don More, Note, The Virtues of Glass-Steagall: An Argument Against Legislative Re-
peal, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 433, 436 (1991).
3. Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the
Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 730 (1999).
4. Lynn Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origins of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS.
L.J. 1, 17 (2011).
5. Cf. PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED BECAME THE DEALER
OF LAST RESORT 4–5 (2011) (arguing that because economics and finance “largely ignore the
sophisticated mechanism that operates to channel cash flows . . . to meet cash commitments,” they
have not “been particularly well suited for understanding the [global financial crisis] during which
the crucial monetary plumbing broke down . . .”).
6. The Uniform Law Commission’s official name is The National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).
7. Cf. Kai Lyu, Framing a Theoretical Paradigm to Understand the Modern Financial Sys-
tem: Synthesizing Functions and Laws (Mar. 1, 2014 draft) (forthcoming doctoral dissertation,
Chinese University of Hong Kong) (on file with author) (also taking a functional approach).
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ing the cost of capital or decreasing its availability. Regulation intended to
protect the financial system as a “system” is commonly referred to as
“macroprudential” regulation.
I. MICROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION
How can we design regulation to make the financial system function
more efficiently? I’ll first examine the functions of the financial system
from an economic standpoint. Thereafter, I’ll examine from the standpoint
of a legal scholar how regulation could be designed to increase the effi-
ciency of those functions.
A. The Functions of the Financial System
The financial system has several economic functions. The principal
function is capital provision, allocation, and deployment (hereinafter,
“funding”); that is, the process of aggregating funds from multiple investors
and then transferring the funds to firms that can productively use it.8 Banks,
for example, engage in funding by borrowing money from depositors and
(other) investors and then lending the money to firms. Markets are used for
funding when issuers sell securities to investors and then either (1) directly
use the money (e.g., a firm issuing its own commercial paper or bonds); or
(2) more indirectly, transfer the money in structured financing transactions
through special-purpose entities (SPEs) to the firm ultimately using the
money (usually in exchange for financial or other assets that will be the
source of investor repayment).
Economists also identify a range of other functions of the financial
system, which tend to center around risk management, behavior monitoring,
and information processing.9 The risk-management function includes diver-
sifying investment risk in order to maximize the amount of investment. Dif-
ferent investors have different risk tolerances. Optimal diversification will
attract both high-risk investors who want high rates of return to compensate
for the risk, and lower-risk investors who are satisfied with lower rates of
return. Risk management can occur in many ways, including the issuance of
securities with senior and subordinated payment priorities and third-party
credit supports such as monoline insurance-company surety bonds and other
forms of hedging, including credit-default swaps.
The behavior-monitoring function focuses on reducing agency costs.
Investors want to align the interests of those firms and their managers, such
as by incentivizing managers through the issuance of stock options. Inves-
8. See Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing the Finan-
cial Environment, in THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 3, 5 (Dwight B. Crane et al. eds., 1995)
(discussing the provision, allocation, and deployment of financial capital).
9. Cf. Lyu, supra note 7 (synthesizing economic views on the functions of the financial
system).
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tors sometimes also impose contractual covenants on firms responsible for
repayment to help ensure that those firms do not engage in excessively
risky activities.
The information-processing function concerns reducing information
asymmetry between investors and issuers of securities. Investors and issuers
cannot efficiently agree on pricing (e.g., the interest rate on the securities)
unless there is full informational transparency. Whereas relationship-bank-
ing traditionally helped to ensure that bank lenders knew their customers,
market-based financing depends more on the disclosure of information to
investors on a transaction-by-transaction basis. That’s not efficient when
investors individually don’t have enough at stake to justify the necessary
due diligence. For debt securities, credit ratings help to reduce information
asymmetry through an economy of scale; but recent experience suggests
that rating agencies—especially in the face of increasing complexity—may
sometimes be unable to fully understand and assess the risks.10
B. Designing Functional Regulation
Next, consider how regulation could be designed to increase the effi-
ciency of the functions described above (“functional regulation”). In gen-
eral, markets are efficient absent market failures; hence, the purpose of
financial regulation is to correct market failures.11 What are the market fail-
ures that impede these financial system functions?
To answer that, consider each function. In designing regulation to
make funding more efficient, we should focus on whether any market fail-
ures impede the ability of the financial system to aggregate funds from mul-
tiple investors or to transfer aggregated funds to firms that can productively
use it. In designing regulation to make risk management more efficient, we
should focus on whether any market failures impede the ability of the finan-
cial system to provide risk-diversified products and investments. In design-
ing regulation to make behavior monitoring more efficient, we should focus
on whether any market failures impede the ability of the financial system to
align the interests of principals and their agents. And in designing regula-
tion to make the information-processing function more efficient, we should
focus on whether any market failures impede the reduction of information
asymmetry.
1. Designing Regulation to Make Funding More Efficient
In designing this regulation, consider whether any market failures im-
pede the ability of the financial system to aggregate funds from multiple
10. Although some allege that the rating-agency failures are also due to conflicts of interest.
11. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 756 (15th ed. 1995)
(defining market failure as “[a]n imperfection in a price system that prevents an efficient alloca-
tion of resources”).
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investors or to transfer aggregated funds to firms that can productively use
them. I have not yet identified specific market failures that impede these
functions. More generally, though, these functions may be subject to ration-
ality failure. Even in financial markets, humans have bounded rationality.
That, in turn, can undermine the reliability of pricing,12 on which aggregat-
ing and transferring funds necessarily depends.13
In areas of complexity, for example, we tend to overrely on heuris-
tics—broadly defined as simplifications of reality that allow us to make
decisions in spite of our limited ability to process information. Modern fi-
nance has become so complex that the financial community routinely relies
on heuristic-based customs, such as determining creditworthiness of securi-
ties by relying on formalistic credit ratings and assessing risk on financial
products by relying on simplified mathematical models. This reliance can
backfire, though, such as when investors rely on credit ratings that are no
longer accurate, or when members of the financial community assess risk
using simplified models that have become misleading.
Market participants also follow the herd in their investment choices
and are prone to panic. Furthermore, due to availability bias, they are un-
realistically optimistic when thinking about extreme events with which they
have no recent experience, devaluing the likelihood and potential conse-
quences of those events.14 It will be a fascinating challenge to consider
how, if at all, regulation could reduce rationality failure or address its
consequences.15
2. Designing Regulation to Make Risk Management More Efficient
In designing this regulation, consider whether any market failures im-
pede the ability of the financial system to provide risk-diversified products
and investments. In another context, I’ve identified at least one possible
market failure. If risk is too widely dispersed, it can become marginalized
12. Cf. ROMAN FRYDMAN & MICHAEL D. GOLDBERG, BEYOND MECHANICAL MARKETS: AS-
SET PRICE SWINGS, RISK, AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE 94 (2011) (observing that “barring infor-
mational asymmetries and other market failures, markets populated by rational individuals are
stable, in the sense that they set prices to fluctuate randomly around intrinsic value[ ]” (emphasis
added) (internal quotations omitted)).
13. Cf. Katharina Pistor, On the Theoretical Foundations for Regulating Financial Markets 2
(June 2012 draft), available at http://works.bepress.com/katharina_pistor/11 (observing that a cur-
rent critique of the efficient market hypothesis, positing that markets accurately reflect prices, is
that market actors are not “rational, autonomous actors [but are] instead beset by herd behavior”).
Another factor that can undermine the reliability of pricing is the “Imperfect Knowledge Con-
straint”: the fact that “information about the past or present does not equal knowledge about the
future.” Id. at 7. Because microprudential regulation cannot correct this market failure, it is an
example of a microprudential regulatory failure that could have systemic consequences—such as
pricing mortgage-backed securities off models that rely on past housing prices.
14. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1366–67 (2011).
15. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz & Lucy Chang, The Custom-to-Failure Cycle, 62 DUKE L.J. 767
(2012) (engaging that question).
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such that rational market participants individually lack the incentive to
monitor it.16 Undermonitoring caused by this incentive failure appears to
have contributed, at least in part, to the global financial crisis.17 So the
regulatory challenge here is to design incentives for adequate monitoring.
3. Designing Regulation to Make Behavior Monitoring More
Efficient
In designing this regulation, consider whether any market failures im-
pede the ability of the financial system to align the interests of principals
and their agents. Scholars have long studied inefficiencies resulting from
conflicts of interest between managers and owners of firms. There is, how-
ever, a much more insidious principal-agent failure—the intra-firm problem
of secondary-management conflicts. The nub of the problem is that secon-
dary managers are almost always paid under short-term compensation
schemes, misaligning their interests with the long-term interests of the
firm.18
Complexity exacerbates this problem by increasing information asym-
metry between technically sophisticated secondary managers and the senior
managers to whom they report. For example, as the VaR (value-at-risk)
model for measuring investment-portfolio risk became more accepted, fi-
nancial firms began compensating secondary managers not only for gener-
ating profits, but also for generating profits with low risks, as measured by
VaR.19 Secondary managers turned to investment products with low VaR
risk profiles, like credit-default swaps that generate small gains but only
rarely have losses. They knew, but did not always explain to their superiors,
that any losses that might eventually occur would be huge.20
In theory, firms can solve this principal-agent failure by paying man-
agers, including secondary managers, under longer-term compensation
schemes (e.g., compensation subject to clawbacks or deferred compensation
based on long-term results). In practice, however, that solution would con-
front a collective action problem—firms that offer their secondary manag-
ers longer-term compensation might not be able to hire as competitively as
firms that offer more immediate compensation. Because good secondary
managers can work in financial centers worldwide, international regulation
may be needed to help solve this collective action problem.
16. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 487 (2012).
17. Id.
18. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-
Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457 (2009).
19. See, e.g., PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR MANAGING FI-
NANCIAL RISK 568 (3d ed. 2006).
20. Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 460.
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4. Designing Regulation to Make the Information-processing
Function More Efficient
In designing this regulation, consider whether any market failures im-
pede the reduction of information asymmetry. Complexity is the main cause
of this information failure.21 Financial markets and products are already
incredibly complex, and that complexity is certain to increase.22
Complexity is undermining disclosure, which since the securities laws
of the 1930s has been the chief regulatory tool to reduce information asym-
metry.23 The Dodd-Frank Act puts great stock in the idea of improving
disclosure, but its efficacy will be limited. Some financial structures are
getting so complex that they are effectively incomprehensible. Furthermore,
it may well be rational for an investor to invest in high-yield complex secur-
ities without fully understanding them.
Moreover, even perfect disclosure would be insufficient to mitigate
information failures that cause systemic risk. Individual market participants
who fully understand the risk will be motivated to protect themselves but
not necessarily the financial system as a whole. A market participant may
well decide to engage in a profitable transaction even though doing so could
increase systemic risk, because, due at least in part to corporate limited
liability, much of the harm from a possible systemic collapse would be ex-
ternalized onto other market participants as well as onto ordinary citizens
impacted by an economic collapse. I will discuss this later in the context of
macroprudential regulation.24
Complexity also makes it difficult for regulators to understand, and
thus effectively regulate, financial products and markets. The complexity of
these products and markets sometimes challenges experts at even the most
sophisticated financial firms.25 The extraordinary income gap between fi-
nancial industry employees and their regulatory counterparts—I’ve recently
21. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87
WASH. U. L. REV. 211 (2009).
22. Profit opportunities are inherent in complexity, due in part to investor demand for securi-
ties that more precisely match their risk and reward preferences. Regulatory arbitrage increases
complexity as market participants take advantage of inconsistent regulatory regimes both within
and across national borders. And new technologies continue to add complexity not only to finan-
cial products but also to financial markets.
23. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1209–35 (1999).
24. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
25. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008
UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1113 (2008) (arguing that although the disclosure documents describing
complex asset-backed securities generally complied with federal securities law, investors did not
fully understand those securities or their risks); Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 243 (observing that R
even the most sophisticated investors lost money in the financial crisis).
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shown that gap is more than two-to-one26—makes it likely that regulators
will be even more challenged to understand the complexity.
This creates a new type of information asymmetry. Scholars tradition-
ally have studied information asymmetries between regulators and the regu-
lated by focusing almost exclusively on information acquisition and
product-development lag time.27 That focus is limited to regulators ob-
taining information. In contrast, the income gap creates an information
asymmetry that results from differences in intellect and abilities between
regulators and the regulated. That focus goes not to obtaining information;
instead, it goes to the ability of financial regulators to process the informa-
tion, once obtained.
I believe that complexity is the greatest future challenge to designing
effective financial regulation.
II. MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION
Recall that macroprudential regulation refers to regulation that is in-
tended to protect the financial system as a “system.” The financial system is
indeed a system—a group of interrelated elements whose functioning as a
whole is distinct from the functioning of its parts. Because of law’s integral
part, the financial system can be characterized as a law-related system. In a
law-related system, the purpose of regulation is “not only to prevent harm-
ful conduct but also to avoid harmful consequences.”28 To that end, regula-
tion of the financial system, qua system, should have two goals: to prevent
negative financial shocks from occurring by limiting the triggers of sys-
temic risk and to mitigate the harm from financial shocks after they occur
by limiting the transmission and impact of those shocks.
A. Ideal Macroprudential Regulation
Ideal macroprudential regulation would act ex ante by eliminating the
triggers of systemic risk. For example, a classic trigger of systemic risk is a
bank run, in which some depositors panic and converge on a bank in a
26. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Intrinsic Imbalance: The Impact of Income Disparity on Finan-
cial Regulation, 78 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. issue no. 2 (forthcoming 2014, Columbia Law
School symposium issue on “The Administrative Law of Financial Regulation”), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2387020.
27. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for
Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 280–81
(2004); Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the
Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1499 (1993) (arguing that regulators
cannot keep up with the development of complex derivatives products because of the time lag);
STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 109 (1982) (arguing that “[t]he central problem
of the standard-setting process and the most pressing task facing many agencies is gathering the
information needed to write a sensible standard”).
28. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the
Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 92 (2013) (emphasis added) (citing Robert
Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 10–11, 23–26 (1976)).
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“grab race” to withdraw their monies first. The standard regulatory solution
is to prevent a depositor panic by providing government deposit insurance.
Policymakers should certainly try to limit the triggers of systemic risk.
In designing macroprudential regulation, for example, they should examine
the appropriate role of limited liability, especially for the small and decen-
tralized firms (such as hedge funds) that dominate the shadow-banking sec-
tor, where equity investors tend to be active managers. Limited liability
gives these investor-managers strong incentives to take risks that could gen-
erate outsize personal profits, even if that greatly increases systemic risk.
Realistically, however, we cannot eliminate all of the triggers of sys-
temic risk because the financial system exhibits the characteristics of—and
effectively comprises—a high-risk system that is susceptible to “normal ac-
cidents.”29 Certain of the market failures that are the subject of imperfect
microprudential regulation could even trigger systemic failures.30 Further-
more, we often lack empirical evidence on regulatory cause and effect.
It therefore is virtually certain that the financial system will face sys-
temic shocks from time to time. Any macroprudential regulatory framework
should be designed to also act ex post, after a systemic shock is triggered,
by breaking the transmission of the shock and limiting its impact. This ap-
proach also accords with chaos theory, which addresses the problem of in-
evitable systemic shocks in complex engineering systems.31 The most
successful (complex) systems are those in which the consequences of fail-
ures are limited. In engineering design, for example, this can be done by
decoupling systems through modularity that helps to reduce a chance that a
failure in one part of the system will systemically trigger a failure in another
part.32
B. Ex Post Macroprudential Regulation
There are several ways that macroprudential regulation could be de-
signed to break the transmission of systemic shocks and limit their impact.
Let’s focus tonight on limiting the impact of systemic shocks on financial
firms and markets.
29. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 1371, n.86, 1393–94.
30. See, e.g., Lyu, supra note 7 (providing an example of a microprudential regulatory failure
that could have systemic consequences). Professors Gordon and Mayer additionally argue that
cross-border harmonization of microprudential regulation is “potentially harmful for the cause of
systemic stability for international finance.” Jeffrey Gordon & Colin Mayer, The Micro, Macro
and International Design of Financial Regulation 21 (Columbia Law and Econ., Working Paper
No. 422, 2012) (draft 2.2 of Mar. 28, 2012) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2047436.
31. See  Schwarcz, supra note 2121, at 248–49 (focusing on the aspect of chaos theory re- R
garding deterministic chaos in dynamic systems, which recognizes that the more complex the
system, the more likely it is that failures will occur).
32. Id.
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Financial regulation has long tried to limit the impact of shocks on
traditional deposit-taking banks, usually by requiring them to comply with
capital and solvency requirements. Since the financial crisis, laws like the
Dodd-Frank Act are beginning to also require other systemically important
financial institutions (“SIFIs”) to be subject to a range of capital and similar
requirements. The extent to which these types of approaches will work, and
their potential impact on efficiency, are open questions for SIFIs. Reducing
a firm’s leverage, for example, can certainly enable the firm to withstand
economic shocks and reduce its chance of failure. The Basel capital require-
ments, however, did not prevent the many bank failures resulting from the
global financial crisis. Setting regulatory limits on leverage could also back-
fire because some leverage is good, but there is no optimal across-the-board
amount of leverage that is right for every firm.33
Another way that regulation could make SIFIs more robust is by re-
quiring at least some portion of their debt to be in the form of so-called
contingent capital. Contingent capital debt would automatically convert to
equity upon the occurrence of pre-agreed events. Ring-fencing can also help
to stabilize systemically important firms by requiring them to be more ro-
bust. For example, ring-fencing is sometimes used to make firms more in-
ternally viable by preventing the firm from engaging in risky activities and
investing in risky assets. The so-called Volcker Rule, which imposes limita-
tions on proprietary trading in order to prevent systemically important fi-
nancial firms from investing in risky assets, exemplifies this approach.
Regulation could also help to stabilize systemically important financial
markets, which are now as much a part of the financial system as firms,34
by requiring them to be more robust. For example, increased speed in data
transmission is generally associated with market efficiency, but the extreme
speeds at which algorithmic trading takes place creates a danger of market
collapse.35 Circuit breakers can be helpful to mitigate the risk of collapse,
suspending trading until investors can determine more realistic prices.
Regulation could further help to stabilize systemically important firms
and markets by providing appropriate liquidity. Liquidity has traditionally
been used, especially by government-central banks, to help prevent finan-
cial firms from defaulting.36 Ensuring liquidity to stabilize systemically im-
33. Cf. Pistor, supra note 13, at 46 (observing that “imposing capital or reserve requirements
can push market participants to find ways [including the use of derivatives] to formally comply
while making sure that their disposable assets are in fact not much curtailed,” thereby creating
“additional sources of liquidity risk [that can] remain[ ] largely unrecognized by financial in-
termediaries and regulators alike”).
34. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198–204 (2008).
35. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINDINGS REGARD-
ING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6 2010, at 14 (2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/
marketevents-report.pdf.
36. Cf. Pistor, supra note 13, at 46 (observing that “while illiquidity may lead to default, it
need not do so, at least not if short-term illiquidity problems can be effectively addressed”).
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portant firms would follow this pattern, except that the source of the
liquidity could at least be partly privatized by taxing those firms to create a
systemic risk fund.
Privatizing the source of liquidity would likewise help to internalize
externalities by addressing the dilemma that market participants are eco-
nomically motivated to create externalities that could have systemic conse-
quences.37 Privatization would not only offset the cost to taxpayers of
liquidity advances that are not repaid, but also (if structured appropriately)
should reduce moral hazard by discouraging fund contributors—including
those that believe they are “too big to fail”—from engaging in financially
risky activities. The likelihood that systemically important firms will have
to make additional contributions to the fund to replenish bailout monies
should also motivate those firms to monitor each other and help control
each other’s risky behavior.
It is not enough, however, to try to stabilize systemically important
firms. Because financial markets can also be triggers and transmitters of
systemic risk, liquidity can—and I believe, should—be used to also stabi-
lize systemically important financial markets.38
Thank you.
37. See Frydman & Goldberg, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
38. For example, in response to the post-Lehman collapse of the commercial paper market,
the U.S. Federal Reserve created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to act as a lender
of last resort for that market, with the goal of addressing “temporary liquidity distortions” by
purchasing commercial paper from highly rated issuers that could not otherwise sell their paper.
The CPFF helped to stabilize the commercial paper market.
